Skeena River Fish Trap Project – By Bob Hooton

What Are We Doing?

Way back in 2021 I became aware of a developing relationship between a few Skeena system steelhead guides and the Washington state based Wild Fish Conservancy (WFC). The subject of their alliance was perceived imperfections in the long-standing steelhead abundance estimation process (i.e. the test fishery) facilitated by Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) since 1956. That operation is conducted in tidal waters of the lower Skeena River immediately adjacent to Highway 16 at a location known as Tyee, just upstream of the commercial fishing boundary. The intent of the guides was to find a method of discrediting the accuracy of the test fishery. Low estimates of abundance reflect badly on the marketing messages of guides and their supporters. Credible information supporting the contention there are significantly more steelhead passing DFO’s test fishery than daily in-season estimates reveal encourages potential customers to book trips.

The figure below illustrates why those engaged in the commercial recreational fishery were so concerned. Five successive years (2019 – 2023 inclusive) of low steelhead returns became an undeniable reality that informed potential customers readily familiarized themselves with. Predictably, the rebound in 2024 was heralded by booking agents for prominent Skeena steelhead guiding operations as a record return. Those who benefit by any suggestion of a stronger steelhead return were quick to embrace the accuracy of the test fishery results. Low years are held to be negatively biased but positive bias is never considered a possibility when estimates are perceived as favourable. What is never recognized is the blue line reflects only the estimated number of steelhead that didn’t get caught in commercial fisheries before they reached the test fishery. Until the mid-1990s the proportion of the total steelhead return harvested in commercial nets in Skeena approach waters was commonly 50%. In three of those down years from 2019 through 2023 there was no commercial fishery, so the blue line reflected total steelhead abundance, not just those that weren’t caught. The most recent year (2024) saw small commercial fishery harvest as well because the fleet size and the number of days open was small relative to earlier years. One other point to note is the estimated number of steelhead reflected in test fishery results does not reflect spawning populations. There is an ever increasing (undisclosed) harvest of steelhead by First Nations fishers in the rivers beyond. There are also losses attributable to catch and release fisheries, poaching, predators and disease.

The early alliance between guides and the WFC revolved around pursuit of construction of a trap patterned after the one the WFC has been operating on the lower Columbia River since at least 2016. Readers are encouraged to look up the WFC web site and see for themselves what their Columbia pound trap undertaking entails. https://wildfishconservancy.org The original intent was to construct a similar trap on the lower Skeena as a cross check on the steelhead abundance estimates provided by DFO’s test fishery. More on that below, after a reality check on the Columbia vs the Skeena.

There is no parallel between the Columbia and the Skeena. The WFC’s Columbia trap is downstream of the entire suite of flow regulating dams which ameliorate the variation in river discharge and debris loads. The tidal amplitude of the Skeena is also much greater. Consider the recent Water Survey of Canada streamflow records for its station near Usk on the Skeena as evidence of its volatility. The point of measurement of this flow is upstream of numerous significant Skeena tributaries (e.g. Copper or Zymoetz, Lakelse, Kitsumkalum, etc.). Adding the contribution of these tributaries to the flow measured upstream from the Copper would substantially increase the discharge levels and volatility at any trap site.

Skeena River discharge as measured at the Water Survey of Canada’s site at Usk, a short distance upstream from the Zymoetz River confluence.

Comparison of the 2024 daily streamflow records for the Columbia and the Skeena for the period the pound trap would be in operation on the latter is instructive. The measurement location on the Columbia is Bonneville Dam which is the furthest downstream flow regulation site on the Columbia. The Columbia discharge range was less than 40%. The Skeena range was almost 1000% with several obvious major spikes between mid-September and early November.

All of the Skeena hydrographic data was readily accessible to the WFC people right from the outset of the signals indicating what their intentions were. In fact it was pointed out publicly. A long period of silence thereafter left the impression the entire plan had been shelved. In retrospect, nothing interrupted their plan. That crystalized on December 14, 2023, when a news release by the respective federal and provincial government ministers responsible for fisheries highlighted a number of projects approved for funding through a program known as the BC Salmon Restoration and Innovation Fund (BCSRIF). That program originated in 2019 with the announcement of hundreds of millions of dollars available for projects that met some unknown criteria. According to that December news, there was an allocation of $2.21M for a Skeena fish trap. Here’s the telltale quote from the release:

Lax Kw’alaams Business Development Ltd. receives $2.21M for the Skeena River Fish Trap Project in collaboration with Skeena Fisheries Commission and the Wild Fish Conservancy to evaluate the feasibility of an impoundment net fish trap in the lower Skeena River (thenarwhal.ca) to harvest salmon and other species.

(The link offered in support of the Skeena project was embarrassingly nonsensical. It spoke to a three-year-old article in a relatively obscure publication describing a project with no resemblance whatsoever to Skeena circumstances.)

Announcement of a project of such magnitude, especially one which appeared to be largely focused on Skeena steelhead was worthy of investigation. The first stop in that regard was the senior steelhead management authority for the Province’s Skeena Region. He advised he had never heard of the project until I brought it to his attention. That begs the question, how was it possible the man in charge of steelhead was uninformed of what appeared to be the single largest steelhead focused project ever in his region when his own Minister had made such an announcement? Next stop, the Pacific Salmon Foundation, an organization with fingerprints all over BCSRIF projects. Nope, they had never heard of it either. Surely the project lead on behalf of the WFC could provide some further instruction on what was afoot. My inquiry to him was never acknowledged. How about the Executive Director of Watershed Watch, an organization that had been very active with respect to Skeena fisheries management over the preceding couple of years? Add one more to the list of those in the dark. On to a contact in the DFO office in Prince Rupert who stated they had never heard of the project. A couple of guides whose operations were focused heavily on the lower Skeena River also reported they knew nothing of the pound trap proposal.

Then, in early January 2024, the first ever publicly available description of what was highlighted a month earlier showed up as a link in a relatively unknown Prince Rupert newspaper. The link, and others attached to it, described what was happening in surprising detail. https://northcoastreview.blogspot.com/2024/01/lax-kwalaams-outline-fish-trap-plans.html Points of interest were numerous. Those who might like to explore those documents will note references to work which had begun in 2019, including reports of those undertakings. Where those reports reside is unknown. The WFC was mentioned at two or three obscure points in the 28-page link within the link. However, those mentions were solely in the context of publications extolling the virtues of the Columbia pound trap. There was no indication of any partnerships with the WFC or, for that matter, the Skeena Fisheries Commission. The disturbing omissions from the newly emerged January 2024 material included no reasonable identification of project objectives, no description of methods, no budget statements and no indication of reporting responsibilities or timelines. How $2.21M goes out the taxpayers’ door on the strength of only the skimpiest, after the fact information that finally surfaced is unconscionable. (For an indication of how local First Nations fishers perceived the trap announcement, readers might want to look at their comments in the newspaper article.)

There were two sites described as potential locations for the trap and commitment to final site selection in time to facilitate driving of 51 steel pilings in the May-June period in 2024. The trap was supposed to be in operation by September 15 and continue through October 31. That alone brought into question who was overseeing this project? With the possible exception of a few late returning coho salmon native to some small lower Skeena tributaries, every Skeena bound almon population is past the DFO test fishery location by the September 15 pound trap startup date. The only reason the test fishery has been operated until the last week of September in recent years is to confirm the annual steelhead return is essentially over by the first or, at the latest, the second week of September. Even if unprecedented favourable flow conditions prevailed such that the trap could be operated until the end of October, what fisheries management purpose could possibly be served by straining waters devoid of the alleged target species? The question is moot, however. No trap was constructed in 2024. Eyewitnesses reported the only evidence of activity at the site chosen was a short, gated access road connecting to Highway 16 plus a large number of Scotsman buoys that were present at one time in the area proposed for those 51 pilings.

Once it became obvious money was being spent by trap proponents, I went back to the WFC project lead with another request for a status report. He maintained his silence. Next, I tried the Manager of Partnerships & Outreach for BCSRIF (a DFO employee). It took almost three weeks for his response. Curiously, it revealed a major gap between his description of the project and what appeared in the only information available previously (i.e. the Prince Rupert newspaper article and associated web sites referenced above). Rather than risking misinterpretation by paraphrasing what the manager said, I’ll cut and paste his reply:

Lax Kw’alaams Fisheries, Skeena Fisheries Commission and Wild Fish Conservancy have partnered on a project studying the feasibility and sustainability of a pound net fish trap on the Skeena River. Project activities include:

• Preliminary site selection studies, permitting, and final design of the fish trap;
• Construction activities, initial operation, and research studies on fish trap efficacy and immediate survival of salmon; and
• Full operation and continuation of immediate and post-release survival studies.

Following the 1^st year of feasibility assessments, a temporary fish trap design was deployed approximately 30 km upstream of the Tyee test fishery on the lower Skeena River and was operational in early August. The trap was operated as non-retention for all salmon and fish species, with the objective of examining the sustainability of this type of gear as a means for the low-impact release of non-target catch. The trap and all components were removed on September 16^th.  Results from the pilot year are being reviewed by the project team and will inform operations in the final Year 3 of the BCSRIF project.

That didn’t strike me as anywhere near describing what had transpired to date so I sent the links that had appeared in the newspaper article and asked the manager appropriate questions about the dates and results he described relative to those expected or observed according to the descriptions in those links. Surely the manager could understand there were major differences between his description and what could be gleaned from all other sources. Three weeks of silence have elapsed since.

The lack of connection between all the dots surrounding this megaproject surfaced again in a November 14, 2024, message from Transport Canada’s Navigation Protection Officer. The officer’s correspondence referred to the original two proposed pound trap location sites (i.e. the ones identified in the Prince Rupert newspaper material). He was soliciting comments from all whose interest might be impacted by a trap and associated docking facilities. Apparently Transport Canada was unaware it was almost a year behind the developments. Almost the same day of the Transport Canada message, the trap issue was brought up at an unrelated local Sport Fish Advisory Committee hosted by DFO’s Recreational Fisheries Advisor. Questions were met with the DFO rep’s response he knew nothing about any trap. Imagine a member of DFO’s own staff in Prince Rupert not knowing anything about such a large undertaking right on their doorstep. Clearly the federal minister was also operating in isolation of her own staff out there at the operational level. One is left to wonder why the BCSRIF Manager of Partnerships and Outreach did not share all the knowledge he claimed to have with staff in his own organization in Prince Rupert?

Now, what would be appropriate action at this point? For openers it can’t be unreasonable to call for an independent third-party audit of both the technical/scientific issues and the financial details surrounding this pound trap project. How such a project would ever be undertaken in the absence of review and collaboration with appropriate scientists and fisheries management professionals is bizarre. Any further action on the project should be shelved pending the results of a comprehensive audit. Next, the opportunistic gold-digging opportunities afforded foreign conservation organizations who partner with BC First Nations to access Canadian taxpayer dollars should be eliminated. The Skeena pound trap project ought to serve as a giant red flag in that context. A legitimate question of the foreigners is why haven’t they joined forces with the BC NGO organizations who have been loud and long in their condemnation of the Southeast Alaska commercial fisheries alleged to be catching as much as 50% of Skeena bound steelhead, as well as millions of Skeena sockeye annually? Doesn’t it make more sense to have a prominent American conservation organization taking on its own fisheries than pretending to be fisheries managers by partnering with a BC First Nation on a lucrative pound trap project with no promise of altering the status quo? How hard would it be to offer $2.1M to trained fisheries professionals right here in downtown BC for their proposals to do something productive with that money?

There is little doubt the December 2024 announcement that Minister Cullen was such a prominent part of was another failed attempt to buy votes from the First Nations members whose numbers are sufficient to influence election outcomes in northwestern BC. Mr. Cullen was soundly defeated in the October 19, 2024, election. His replacement, Ms. Sharon Hartwell, is not a member of the governing party as was Cullen. However, Ms. Hartwell has strong connections to the steelhead scenario in the Skeena. She is probably an excellent candidate to create pressure for answers and appropriate action by the party that retains power by the slimmest possible margin in the BC Legislature. The next logical candidate with whom to register recommendations is Ms. Randene Neill, Mr. Cullen’s replacement as Minister of Water, Land and Resource Stewardship. The contact information for MLA Hartwell and Minister Neill has not yet been posted on the Province of BC web site but it will be within days at most. Ms. Neill is entering the BC political scene for the first time ever. This would be a good issue to test her approach to fiscal responsibility and management based on science.

I hesitate to drag on here but there is another pound trap project underway that also warrants mention. That involves a group of five, Campbell River area First Nations partnered with the WFC to build and operate another Columbia style trap, this time on the tidal reach of the Campbell River on Vancouver Island. The process is a carbon copy of the Skeena. The general public knew nothing of what had already been sanctioned and funded through the BCSRIF until an article appeared in the Campbell River newspaper. The only difference between Campbell and Skeena is the budget for the former is only half that of the latter. The timetable offered has nowhere near been met. The objective of providing food security for the five FNs is absurd. There are several commercial fishing seiners owned and operated by one of those FNs. Food fish provision for every FN member involved in the trap project is not a problem. Besides, introduced pink salmon now dominate the Campbell’s fish supply. Those fish have never been of interest to FNs and not just because they never existed in the Campbell system until very recent times. Chinook and coho are the preferred species for FNs. Both are enhanced and readily available at the weir at the hatchery site on the Quinsam River, the Campbell’s main tributary. The distance between the trap site and the weir is 4 miles or 6.4 km. What sense does it make to spend more than $1M on a trap that would be a nightmare to operate due to the predictable glut of unwanted pink salmon when the two preferred species are free for the taking almost within sight?

Author’s photo of the Campbell River pound trap site, September 5, 2024. A business owner in the adjacent industrial area reported there had been no sign of activity since the pilings were driven.

Bear with me for one final example to illustrate the madness we find ourselves buried in. In late September 2024, the Portland Oregon based Wild Salmon Center advertised a new position titled British Columbia Program Director. One would have to be awfully naïve to interpret this as anything other than intent to cash in on funding sources such as the BCSRIF program. Partnerships with BC First Nations was emphasized but there was no hint of linkage with any government agency professionals. Look for yourself. https://wildsalmoncenter.org/who/jobs/ Have these large conservation focused marketers run out of projects involving American waters and fish, has the competition for donations become too much for survival or both?

R.S. Hooton

November 21, 2024